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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On March 3, 2007, officers obtained a search warrant to search 6501 Poplar in 
Boise, Idaho, following the death of an infant child in the basement apartment of the 
residence. Michael Reynolds rented a bedroom in this residence and shared the 
common areas with the other residents. Although the warrant mentioned in passing the 
smell of growing marijuana coming from a locked bedroom upstairs, much of the 
warrant dealt with the investigation of the infant's death. During the search of the entire 
residence, marijuana plants were found in Mr. Reynolds' locked room. In his 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Reynolds argued that the search of his bedroom apartment 
violated his Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitutional rights to be free from unlawful 
searches and seizures, because the search warrant failed to specifically authorize the 
search of his bedroom apartment, and the evidence seized from this search should be 
suppressed. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) 
In response, the State argues that the search warrant in question satisfied the 
particularity requirement of the United States and Idaho Constitutions, was not 
overbroad, and that even if the search warrant was defective, the search of 
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom apartment was still reasonable because "Detective Stiles" did 
not know, nor should he reasonably have known of, the multi-unit nature of the 
residence. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address these 
arguments raised by the State. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Reynolds' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Reynolds' motion to suppress because the 
warrant lacked particularity regarding the search of Mr. Reynolds' apartment? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Reynolds' Motion To Suppress Because 
The Warrant Lacked Particularity Regarding The Search Of Mr. Reynolds' Apartment 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Reynolds contends the search of his bedroom apartment violated his Fourth 
Amendment and Idaho Constitutional rights to be free from unlawful searches and 
seizures because the search warrant failed to specifically authorize the search of his 
bedroom apartment. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) 1 In response, the State argues that 
the search warrant in question, ( 1) satisfied the particularity requirement of the United 
States' and Idaho Constitutions, (2) was not overbroad, and (3) that even if the search 
warrant was defective, the search of Mr. Reynolds' bedroom apartment was still 
reasonable under Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987), because "Detective Stiles 
did not know, nor should he reasonably have known, the multi-unit nature of the 
residence." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) These three issues are each addressed in turn 
below. 
B. The Search Warrant Did Not Satisfy The Particularity Requirement Of The United 
State's And Idaho Constitutions 
First, the State asserts that the search warrant in question satisfied the 
particularity requirement because, although it did not describe "the legal (i.e. rental) 
1 In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Reynolds' also addressed the court's finding that the 
search was proper and no warrant was required under the "plain smell" doctrine. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-13.) The State has not addressed this argument in response, 
noting that the district court had three implied basis for denying Mr. Reynolds' motion to 
suppress and that on appeal, the State was presenting two of these reasons and raising 
a third, alternative basis, to affirm the district court's ruling. (Respondent's Brief, p.6, 
n.1.) 
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arrangement pertaining to [Mr.] Reynolds' bedroom, the search warrant nonetheless 
particularly described the physical residence to be searched by providing the correct 
street address, which included [Mr.] Reynolds' bedroom." (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) 
To support this argument, the State cites State v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 715, 39 P.3d 
651, 655 (Ct. App. 2002), and focuses on the fact that the description of the home itself 
was adequate. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) However, this argument ignores the fact 
that multi-unit dwellings have been treated differently than a single family residence and 
a general description of the address of the building without identification of the specific 
unit is not adequate to satisfy the Fourth Amendment or the Idaho State Constitutional 
requirements that a warrant must '"particularly describe the place to be searched and 
the person or thing to be seized."' State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 985,989,188 P.3d 927,931 
(2008) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 17); (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.6-9.) 
It is well established that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity 
requirement is "to prevent general searches." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 
(1987). Specifically, "[b]y limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and 
things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the 
search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of 
the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Id. (citing 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
569-572 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring in result); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-
82, 485 (1965); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); 
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927)). 
5 
State v. Young dealt specifically with a single family residence and the adequacy 
of the description of that residence in the warrant. See Young, 136 Idaho at 654-55, 39 
P.3d at 714-15. Applying Young to multi-unit residences to argue that only the street 
address need to be given without specifying which apartment or describing the unit, is 
contradictory to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Maryland v. Garrison, as 
well as federal circuit court opinions that have required a description of the unit to be 
searched in multi-unit residences. See Garrison, at 85-86. United States v. Busk, 693 
F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Therefore, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, the warrant in question failed to meet the 
particularity requirement of the United States and Idaho Constitutions because it failed 
to specify Mr. Reynolds' bedroom or unit. (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.6-9.) 
C. The Search Warrant Was Overbroad 
In Response to Mr. Reynolds' argument on appeal that the warrant was invalid 
because it did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the State also argues that the warrant in 
this case was not overbroad because the affidavit provided probable cause to search 
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom.2 (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.) However, the affidavit did not 
2 In the Respondent's Brief that State notes that the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to be specific in both particularity of what 
is sought and in breath by limiting the scope of the warrant to the probable cause on 
which it is based. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11 (quoting United States v. Spilotoro, 
800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986).) Although, Mr. Reynolds has argued that the warrant 
in question does not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
generally, this argument has essentially encompassed both particularity and breadth, 
although it has mostly been relevant to the warrant's overbreadth because it failed to 
specify which unit was to be searched. 
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specify Mr. Reynolds' bedroom specifically, stating only that the Detective "smelled the 
odor of growing marijuana in the residence, apparently coming from an upstairs 
bedroom that is locked." (R., p.44.) As both Mr. Reynolds' and Detective Stiles testified 
at the motion to suppress hearing, there were two bedrooms upstairs, both of which 
were locked and both of which were searched during the execution of the search 
warrant. (Tr.9/14/07, p.28, L.6 - p.31, L.15; p.53, L.21 - p.52, L.6.) Therefore, even if 
the State is correct in asserting that the warrant established probable cause to search 
Mr. Reynolds' room, even though the multi-unit nature of the residence was not 
disclosed, the warrant is still overbroad and did not provide probable cause to search 
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom because it did not specifically identify which of the bedrooms 
Detective Stiles smelled marijuana coming from. (R., p.44.) Furthermore, the use of 
the word "apparently" in the affidavit also implies that the affiant did not have first hand 
knowledge of which bedroom the smell was emanating from. (R., p.44.) 
Although Detective Stiles testified at the motion to suppress hearing that 
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom had an odor of growing marijuana, as the State notes, "whether 
the search warrant in [Mr.] Reynolds' case was overbroad depends on whether the 
supporting affidavit provided probable cause to search [Mr.] Reynolds' bedroom." 
(Respondent's Brief p.11 (citing Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85).). Here, the affidavit in 
support of the warrant did not provide specific probable cause to search Mr. Reynolds' 
bedroom apartment. See State v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 278,858 P.2d 814, 817 
(Ct. App. 1993) ("In order to provide an adequate basis for a determination of probable 
cause to issue a search warrant, the assertions in the affidavit must establish a 
sufficient nexus between criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the place to be 
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searched."); State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (reviewing only the 
facts presented in the affidavit to determine probable cause when there was no record 
of the hearing conducted before issuing the warrant). Therefore, the fact Detective 
Stiles had information related specifically to Mr. Reynolds' room that was not disclosed 
in the affidavit for the warrant does not now provide probable cause to search the room. 
D. If The Search Warrant Was Defective In Its' Description Of The Place To Be 
Searched. The Search Was Not Reasonable Under Maryland v. Garrison 
Finally, the State argues "[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that [sic] was some defect 
in the description of the place to be search, and that the search warrant was therefore 
overbroad, the search was still reasonable" under Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 
(1987).3 (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) However, the State's argument misapplies 
Garrison because before upholding the search in Garrison, the Supreme Court upheld 
the warrant. Furthermore, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, the officers in this case 
knew or should have known of the multi-unit nature of the residence in question. See id. 
at 86, 88; (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-11.) 
In Garrison the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
warrant executed in error at the defendant's apartment. Id. The defendant resided on 
the third floor of an apartment building. Id. at 80. An apartment occupied by Lawrence 
McWebb was also on the third floor. Id. at 80. Officers obtained a search warrant for 
3 Although it appears the State is simply arguing the warrant and search should have be 
upheld under Garrison, to the extent the State is attempting to a make an argument that 
the officers were acting on good faith on the warrant if it is invalid, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has expressly rejected the good faith exception to the warrant requirement in 
Idaho under Idaho's exclusionary rule. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 
(1992). 
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the third floor of the apartment building. Id. At the time officers applied for and obtained 
the warrant, they believed there to be only one apartment on the third floor. Id. This 
belief was based on investigation by officers who made inquiries at the apartment 
building, made a check of gas and electric bills, and researched police records. Id. at 
85 n.10. Pursuant to the officers' investigations, there appeared to be only one 
apartment on the third floor of the building. Id. 
When officers made entry into the third-floor of the building, they first entered a 
common hallway shared by both apartments on the third floor. Id. at 81. After the 
officers had begun their search and found heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia in the 
defendant's apartment, they realized the third floor contained two apartments: 
defendant's and Mr. McWebb's. Id. Upon making this discovery, the officers 
terminated their search and did not make any further searches of defendant's 
apartment. Id. 
The defendant was charged with violating the controlled substances act. Id. He 
moved to suppress all evidence seized from his apartment, arguing that the search of 
his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Id. at 80. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and on 
appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded 
the case for a new trial. The state appealed. Id. at 81-82. 
With respect to the validity of the warrant and the officers' initial entry into the 
defendant's apartment, the United States Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
We have no difficulty concluding that the officers' entry into the third-floor 
common area was legal; they carried a warrant for those premises, and 
they were accompanied by McWebb, who provided the key that they used 
to open the door giving access to the third-floor common area. If the 
9 
officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained 
two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, 
and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have 
been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's apartment. 
Id. at 86 (emphasis added). The Court then went on to analyze the officer's search of 
the defendant's apartment finding that the search of the defendant's apartment was 
"consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be 
searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 88. The Court noted 
that "the validity of the search of the [defendant's] apartment pursuant to a warrant 
authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on whether the officers' failure to 
realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable." 
Id. Thus, in upholding the search, the Court first found that the warrant was valid and 
then that the search pursuant to that warrant was reasonable. See id. at 85-88. 
Therefore, the State's argument that the search can be upheld under Garrison even if 
the warrant is deemed invalid misapplies the holding in Garrison. 
Additionally, unlike Garrison, the officers in this case had the same information 
regarding the multi-unit character of the residence when they obtained the warrant as 
when they executed it; therefore, if the warrant is deemed invalid because they knew or 
should have known that Mr. Reynolds' bedroom was a separate unit or apartment, then 
the search is also invalid. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.) Furthermore, as 
Mr. Reynolds' previously argued in his Appellant's Brief, and incorporates herein by 
reference, the officers knew of should have known that the residence in question was a 
multi-unit residence and that the warrant was overbroad, making their search of 
Mr. Reynolds' room unreasonable. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.) Therefore, 
Mr. Reynolds contends the district court erred when it denied his motion so suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Reynolds respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
remand this case with the instruction that the evidence seized in the search of his room 
be suppressed. 
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2009. 
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